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1:1977 CASE COMMENT III I
Freedom of Religion: State Aid to Religiously Affiliated
College Can Co-Exist with the First Amendment's
Establishment of Religion Clause: Roemer v. Board
of Public Works of Maryland
Plaintiffs, four individual Maryland citizens and taxpayers, brought this
action challenging the constitutionality of a Maryland statute, granting
general state aid to private institutions of higher learning. Because the
defendants who received aid were religious colleges,2 plaintiffs alleged
that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution3 by fostering government sup-
I. MD. EDuc. CODE ANN., art. 77A, § 65-69 (1975) authorizes the payment of
state funds to any private institution of higher learning that meets certain minimum
criteria, and refrains from awarding "only seminarian or theological degrees." The aid
is in the form of an annual fiscal year subsidy to qualifying colleges and universities,
based upon the number of students, excluding those in seminarian or theological aca-
demic programs. The grants are not disbursed for any particular purpose, but, under a
provision added in 1972 ( 68-A), they cannot be used for "sectarian purposes." The
program is administered by the Maryland Council for Higher Education, which assures
that recipient institutions (1) do not award primarily theological or seminary degrees,
and (2) do not use the funds for "sectarian purposes." At the end of the year, the
recipient institution must make a report and separately specify the nonsectarian expend-
itures.
2. In addition to the responsible state officials, plaintiffs-appellants joined as
defendants five colleges they claimed were constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid.
Four were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, and one with the Methodist
Church. The Methodist affiliate, however, was dismissed as a defendant-appellee, and
the Supreme Court dealt only with the four Roman Catholic affiliates. Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 2343-44 (1976).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . .
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to remain away from
Church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, or for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
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port of religion. A three-judge federal district court' upheld the statute
as not violating the Establishment Clause.' On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court6 affirmed and HELD, the Maryland statute does not
foster state support of religion in contravention of the Establishment
Clause.7
In examining the issue of separation of church and state, the Su-
preme Court has not expected a "hermetic separation of the two,
[recognizing that such a pure distinction] is an impossibility."8 The
Court has further described the line of separation as a "blurred, indis-
tinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a par-
ticular relationship."' The Court has, however, expected and insisted
upon State neutrality toward religion. 0
To preserve this guarded neutrality," a three-pronged test is ap-
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (Black, J.).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed 1976) and 28 U.S.C. 2284 (1970) (amended
1974) provided for a three-judge district court to hear all cases in which an injunction
was sought to restrain the enforcement, operation, or execution of any state statute on
the grounds of that statute's unconstitutionality.
5. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974), affd. 96
S.Ct. 2337 (1976).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) allows for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any case
required "by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges."
7. 96 S.Ct. at 2337 (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2344.
9. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). Reflecting this indistinct sepa-
ration, the Supreme Court has sustained public aid to a hospital staffed by an order of
Catholic nuns. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). It has allowed state reim-
bursement to parents for fares paid for transportation by public carriers of children
attending public and Catholic schools. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
It has also approved the lending of secular textbooks to parochial school students. Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court has also rejected the argument that
no state aid to religious institutions is permissible because it frees the institution's
resources to be put to sectarian ends. 96 S.Ct. at 2345.
10. 96 S.Ct. at 2345.
II. The history of governmentally established religion both in England and in this
country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular
form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred,
disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same history
showed that many people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied upon
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plied in cases involving Establishment Clause issues.' 2 The test first
scrutinizes the statute in question to see that it has the necessary, secular
legislative purpose. Next, it tests the statute to determine if it has the
impermissible primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Fi-
nally, it examines the operation of the statute to assure that it does not
weave excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v.
Kurtzman," which itself crystallized the three-pronged test, and a subse-
quent case, Hunt v. McNair,5 have offered refinements to the basic test.
In Lemon, the Supreme Court dealt with statutes from two states.
One awarded a salary supplement to teachers in private schools, if those
teachers agreed only to teach the same courses and use the same materi-
als as those in the public schools, and if they agreed not to teach courses
in religion. The other statute authorized state education officials to
"purchase" secular educational services from private schools, and to
reimburse participating schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
materials.
The Court struck down the salary supplement program because it
would cause "[the] kind of state inspection and evaluation of the reli-
gious content of a religious organization [that] is fraught with the sort
of entanglement that the Constitution forbids."'" The Court struck
down the other program because it would foster the same kind of rela-
tionship.17 While applying the third, or excessive government entangle-
ment prong, the Court designated three additional factors for considera-
tion. They include: (1) the character and purpose of the benefited institu-
tion, (2) the nature of the aid provided, and (3) the resulting relationship
between the state and the religious authority."8
Hunt, which upheld a state law providing for state participation in
the support of government to spread its faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands
as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its "unhallowed perversion"
by a civil magistrate. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an
awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and reli-
gious persecutions go hand in hand.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962).
12. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
13. Id. at 612-13.
14. 403 U.S. 602.
15. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
16. 403 U.S. 602, 620.
17. Id. at 621.
18. Id. at 615.
3
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the issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of a Baptist College,"
refined the second, or "primary effect" prong. In its opinion, the Court
said:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing
religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive
that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise
substantially secular setting.3
A third case which heavily influenced the Court in Roemer was
Tilton v. Richardson.2' It involved a federal plan for grants and loans
to institutions of higher learning for the construction of academic facili-
ties. The act was drafted to insure that the subsidized facilities would
be devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient
institutions. In upholding this plan, the Court relied on the more ma-
ture, sophisticated, and academic atmosphere of a college as opposed
to that of an elementary or high school. The Court also favorably
considered the non-ideological nature of the aid; that the aid is a one-
time single purpose grant, and that cumulatively this would lead to very
little potential for political divisiveness.
Applying Lemon's basic test and its complex refinements, the Su-
preme Court has been able to look at Establishment Clause cases with
a focus on all relevant factors. Utilizing such a view, the Court has
upheld state aid in cases such as Hunt, Tilton, and now Roemer, where
the aid did not appear to further a sectarian mission. However, this
cumulative viewpoint has also allowed the Court to strike down aid
tainted with the appearance of furthering an institution's sectarian mis-
sion."
19. The act excluded any aid to "any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of religious worship [or to] any facility... used primarily in
connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity. .. ."
The program was upheld because the Court found the aid not to have a "primary effect"
of advancing religion because the institution was not "pervasively sectarian." 413 U.S.
at 743, 745 (quoting S.C. CODE § 22-41.2(b) (Supp. 1971).
20. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U:S. 734, 743"(1973).
21. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
22. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973), where the Court struck down aid to elementary and secondary schools which
were found to conform to a profile of a substantially religious school, as opposed to
the schools involved in Tilton and Hunt. The aid involved (1) direct subsidies for repair
of buildings, (2) reimbursement of parents for a percentage of tuition paid, and (3) tax
4
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In considering the present case, the Court acknowledged:
The slate we write on is anything but clean. Instead, there is little room
for further refinement of the principles governing public aid to church-
affiliated private schools. Our purpose is not to unsettle those principles
.. . or to expand upon them substantially, but merely to insure that they
are faithfully applied in this case.2
The Supreme Court, in its analysis of Roemer, immediately in-
voked the use of Lemon's three-prong test. The first prong, the purpose
of the statute, was briefly discussed and dismissed as not being in issue.
The Maryland statute was conceded to have the secular purpose "of
supporting private higher education generally, as an economic alterna-
tive to a wholly public system." 2'
Applying the second, or "primary effect" question, the Court de-
scribed it as the "substantive [question] of what private educational
activities, by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds."2'
Recognizing the "primary effect" refinements of Hunt," the Court con-
cluded, "(1) that no state aid at all [can] go to institutions that are so
'pervasively sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from
sectarian ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out,
they alone may be funded."' 1
In applying this test to the Maryland statute,28 the Court relied
heavily upon the findings of the federal district court. The lower federal
court had found the appellee colleges to be "not 'pervasively sectar-
ian,"' and supported that conclusion "with a number of subsidiary
findings concerning the role of religion on these campuses."29 These
breaks for parents. All three were found to have an impermissible "primary effect" of
advancing religion. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
472 (1973), also struck down a system of aid to elementary and secondary schools that
provided for reimbursements for the school's testing and record keeping expenses. It
did so because the schools met the same sectarian profile as the schools in Nyquist, and
there was a "substantial risk" that religious instruction might be included on examina-
tions supported by the state, or that state-funded tests would "be drafted with an eye,
unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsor-
ing church." Id. at 480.
23. 96 S.Ct. at 2348.
24. Id. at 2348-49.
25. Id. at 2349.
26. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
27. 96 S.Ct. at 2349.
28. Md. Educ. Code Ann., art. 77A, §§ 65-69 (1975).
29. 96 S.Ct. at 2349.
115 1
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subsidiary findings produced several salient features about the schools,
the more important ones being: the existence of "institutional auton-
omy" from the Roman Catholic Church;31 the absence of religious
indoctrination as a substantive purpose of any defendant;"' the exist-
ence of "an atmosphere of intellectual freedom [free from] religious
pressures";2 the classification of classroom prayer as "peripheral to
the subject of religious permeation";3 and a system of faculty hiring
and student acceptance not determined on a religious basis.,, Hinting
to the critical issue of the case,3 the Court acknowledged that the
district court's findings had described religious institutions similar in
almost all respects to those considered in Tilton and Hunt." The Court
found no difference between the institutions, thereby holding that the
Catholic colleges were not pervasively sectarian.Y
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2349, 2350.
34. Id. at 2350.
35. In analyzing the third-prong of Lemon's test (excessive entanglement), the
Court revealed that it considers the character of the aided institution as more important
than the nature of the aid itself. Therefore it found this case more closely aligned with
Tilton and Hunt than with Lemon, Nyquist, or Levitt. 96 S.Ct. at 2353. In its analysis,
the Court relied heavily on descriptive profiles of the schools in question. The profile
of the Lemon, Nyquist, and Levitt schools revealed institutions that:
(a) [impose] religious restrictions on admissions; (b) require attendance of pupils
at religious activities; (c) require obedience by students to the doctrines and
dogmas of a particular faith; (d) require pupils to attend instruction in the theol-
ogy or doctrine of a particular faith; (e) are an integral part of the religious
mission of the church sponsoring it; (f) have as a substantial purpose the
inculcation of religious values; (g) impose religious restrictions on faculty appoint-
ments; and (h) impose religious restrictions on what or how the faculty may teach.
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68.
The profile of the Tilton, Hunt schools, however, proved that:
[Njon-Catholics were admitted as students and given faculty appointments. Not
one . . . require[d] its students to attend religious services. . . . [theology
courses] are not limited to courses about the Roman Catholic religion. The
schools . . . made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to proselytize. Finally
• . . these four schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles of aca-
demic freedom. ...
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686-87 (1971). The Court, once convinced that the
colleges affected by the Maryland statute fit the profile of Tilton, began to move toward
a holding consistent with that case. 96 S.Ct. at 2354.
36. 96 S.Ct. at 2350-51.
37. Id. at 2351.
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Continuing with the requirements of Hunt, the Court next consid-
ered whether aid was in fact only extended to the "secular side. ' 3 The
Court again agreed with the finding of the district court that the exten-
sion of aid only to the secular side was assured "by the statutory prohi-
bition against sectarian use, and by the administrative enforcement of
that prohibition through the [Maryland] Council for Higher Educa-
tion."'" As if to urge and assure compliance with the statutory safe-
guards, the Court said it would expect the Council and the colleges to
avoid any "'specifically religious activity,' and minimize any constitu-
tional questions."'"
Having examined the purpose of the statute and its primary effect,
the Supreme Court next considered the difficult question of "excessive
entanglement."" If the "primary effect" question was termed to be
substantive, this was described as a procedural one. Did the operation
of the statute, by its requirements of school application and Council
approval, report submission and administrative review of expenditures,
entwine the religious institutions into an excessive entanglement with
government? In this analysis of the entanglement test, the additional
three factors mentioned in Lemon were given significant emphasis. 42
Since the schools were found to be not "pervasively sectarian" under
the second prong of the test, the Court felt that the "character of the
aided institutions" was such that the "secular activities could be taken
at face value. . . .The need for close surveillance of purportedly secu-
lar activities is correspondingly reduced."' 3 '
The second factor in Lemon's refinement of the entanglement test,
namely, the "form of the aid," was passed over and included in the third
factor, the "resulting relationship" of secular and religious authority.4
Initially, the Court disposed of what might be considered a very entan-
38. See text accompanying note 27, supra.
39. 96 S.Ct. at 2351. "None of the moneys payable under this subtitle shall be
utilized by the institutions for sectarian purposes." MD. EDUc. CODE ANN. art. 77A, §
68A.
40. 96 S.Ct. at 2351.
41. Id. at 2352.
42. See text accompanying note 18, supra.
43. In looking at this "character-of-institution" factor, the Court used its profile
analysis already determined in the consideration of whether or not the colleges were
"pervasively sectarian." See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra. The colleges were
found to perform "essentially secular educational functions . . . that are distinct and
separable from religious activity." 96 S.Ct. at 2352.
44. Id.
17 1
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gling element of the aid: that it was to be granted on an annual basis.
The annual nature of the aid was not considered fatal to the program,"5
"in. . . light of the character of the aided institutions, and the resulting
absence of any need 'to investigate the conduct of particular classes.' "46
After dealing with this superficial flaw in the Maryland program,
the Supreme Court indicated what it considered to be the essential
reason for upholding the aid in question. Although a "one-time, single-
purpose" construction grant, as in Tilton, was preferable over the type
created by the Maryland program,47 Tilton was considered to be con-
trolling, even though the form of the aid was readily distinguishable."s
The Court narrowed its analysis of the aid program before it to one
fundamental question: Is it distinguishable from Tilton by the form-of-
aid, or by the character-of-institution? It held the difference to be form-
of-aid only and of questionable importance.4" This case's characterrof-
institution difference with Lemon, however, was held to be "most im-
pressive."' 0 In contrast to the factual situation in Lemon,5 where perva-
sively sectarian elementary and secondary schools were involved, the
Maryland Council for Higher Education could supervise the program
without entanglement because the "secular and sectarian activities of
the college are easily separated. 52 Any contacts between the+ Council
and the colleges were "not likely to be any more entangling than the
inspections and audits incident to the normal process of the college's
45. Id. at 2352, 2353.
46. Id. at 2352 (quoting language from the district court).
47. Id. at 2353.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Since Nyquist and Levitt fell in line with Lemon, this case's difference with
Lemon automatically prevented it from falling in line with Nyquist and Levitt, as
appellants urged. 96 S.Ct. at 2354.
51. Repeating the elements of its important "profile," the Court looked at the
characteristics of the schools in Lemon. Elementary and secondary schooling comes at
an impressionable age; the schools were supervised by the Catholic diocese; each had a
local Catholic parish that assumed
ultimate financial responsibility for it; principals were appointed by religious
authorities; religion pervaded the school system, and teachers were instructed that
religious formation is neither confined to formal courses nor restricted to a simple
subject area. These things made impossible what is crucial to a non-entangling
aid program: the ability of the State to identify and subsidize separate secular
functions carried out at the school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary
to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes.
96 S.Ct. at 2353 (quoting the opinion from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 617, 618).
52. Id.
1 118
Nova Law Journal 1:977 1
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/9
Roemer v. Board of Public Works
1:1977
accreditation by the State."'m Such inspections could not be done so
innocuously with the schools in Lemon.
A concern voiced in Lemon that government-religion entanglement
could lead to "political divisiveness"" was also dismissed by the Court
on the grounds that the student population of a college, unlike the
parents of elementary or secondary school students, is diverse and
widely dispersed, thus creating no local political power base from which
to lobby and seek more aid for their respective institutions.
The Court admitted the obvious when it said: "There is no exact
science in gauging the entanglement'of church and state."" The only
hint offered was that all relevant factors identified by the three-pronged
test of Lemon and its refinements must be considered "'cumulatively'
in judging the degree of entanglement."" The Court did, however, spe-
cifically agree with the importance given by the district court "to the
character of the aided institutions," and with the lower court's findings
that the colleges "are capable of separating secular and religious
functions."'" In so affirming, the Supreme Court upheld its commitment
not to refine further the existing test of Lemon and its probing factors,"
but it did give valuable insight into how the test is to be applied, and
which factual matters it considered critical.
Few would argue that government cannot be kept antiseptically
free from religion." Fewer still would want such a situation. Even Jus-
tice Douglas, who ardently supported a clean separation of church and
state," acknowledged that it would be undesirable to insist on such total
separation that government became hostile to religion:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2353, 2354. In Lemon the Court said that annual subsidies would create
a relationship of dependence between the state and the institutions, and that increased
demand and dependence for state funds would create a danger of political fragmentation
along religious lines. 403 U.S. at 623.
55. 96 S.Ct. at 2354.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2348.
59. See text accompanying notes 8-9, supra.
60. 403 U.S. at 697 (Douglas, J., dissenting): "I dissent not because of any lack
of respect for parochial schools but out of a feeling of despair that the respect which
through history has been accorded the First Amendment is this day lost." (The majority
had upheld federal construction grants to institutions of higher learning).
19 1
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room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of
man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government
that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When
the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs,
it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spirit-
ual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor
undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education
nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person.
But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts
to widen the effective scope of religious influence."'
Falling in line with some of Douglas' language are cases which have
allowed aid on the grounds that government cannot refrain from making
available to religious institutions what it makes available to all. 2 In fact,
in Walz v. Tax Commission," aid in the form of property tax exemp-
tions was extended to church properties in order to assure that govern-
ment and religion could minimize their frictional contacts.
Where then does Roemer fit in balancing these solemn inter-
ests-the integrity of the "Establishment Clause" and the necessity that
government not discriminate against religion? Roemer's holding has
been described as a "hairline crack in the wall between church and
state." This reaction fails to note, however, that the wall was never
61. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952). In this case, Douglas joined
in affirming a New York program which allowed public schools to release students,
during school hours, on written requests of their parents, so that they may leave the
school buildings and grounds and go to religious centers for religious instruction or
devotional exercises. Contra McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
62. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). In Meek, a textbook
program was upheld on the authority of Allen. Two other forms of aid, however,
involving (1) instructional material and equipment, and (2) a supply of professional
staff, were struck down as having an impermissible primary effect of establishing reli-
gion because of the predominately religious character of the schools. A discussion of
Meek is noted in The Supreme Court. 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 104 (1975).
63. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
64. Miami Herald, June 23, 1976 (Editorial) at 6, High Court Ruling Shakes
Nova Law Journal
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absolute.5 Confined by its facts,6 Roemer serves to lucidly guide state
legislatures in drafting legislation that refrains from "quarantining reli-
gious institutions,"1 and, at the same time, refrains from unconstitu-
tionally supporting them.
Noting the importance of the differing character-of-institutions
profiles between the schools in Roemer, Tilton, and Hunt, and those in
Lemon, Nyquist, and Levitt, it seems that aid to religious elementary
and secondary schools will have a difficult time passing constitutional
scrutiny. It is likely that these schools will be found to be "pervasively
sectarian," which necessarily will create "entanglement" problems, as
the state seeks to monitor the aid and insure that it is put only to secular
uses.
68
For institutions fitting the profile of Roemer, however, aid to their
secular functions should not fall on constitutional grounds.69 As long as
the aid originates from a statute having a secular legislative purpose,
and the state is financing a separable secular function of overriding
importance, it should stand.70 The holding in Roemer assures religious
institutions that they will not be denied secular aid simply because it
Separation of Church, State.
65. "Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separa-
tion, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on
all the circumstances of a particular relationship." 403 U.S. at 614.
66. Clearly, Roemer's holding applies only to religious institutions engaging in
the art of educating, and educating in a secular manner within an atmosphere of intellec-
tual freedom. Also, it is concerned only with state aid to those institutions. Roemer does
not deal with issues such as prayer in public schools or Sunday closing laws.
67. 96 S.Ct. at 2344.
68. This does not, however, totally discount "the form of the aid" consideration.
See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). There the court upheld aid to elementary
and parochial schools in the form of a textbook loan program. Although these schools
were considered religion-pervasive, the textbook program was upheld because the secu-
lar content of a textbook could be readily ascertained, whereas what a teacher teaches
cannot be.
69. But see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, 3., dissenting):
I do not see any significant difference. . . in telling the sectarian university not
to teach any nonsecular subjects in a certain building, and. . . telling the Catho-
lic school teacher not to teach religion. The vice is the creation through subsidy
of a relationship in which the government polices the teaching practices of a
religious school or university.
70. 96 S.Ct. at 2355 (White, 3., with Rehnquist, J., concurring). Brennan, 3., in
his dissent, said that "the Establishment Clause. . .forbids the government to provide
funds to sectarian universities in which the propagation and advancement of a particular
religion are a function or purpose of the institution." Id. at 2356.
121 1
11
et al.: Freedom of religion: State Aid to Religiously Affiliated College
Published by NSUWorks, 1977
122 Nova Law Journal 1:1977 1
incidentally aids them in their sectarian functions. It also assures them,
however, that state aid will not be available to further their efforts in
proselytizing, or pursuing their sectarian mission. The "blurry and in-
distinct" wall separating government from religion before Roemer
stands intact after Roemer. It remains up to the states, if they value
private education as an economic alternative to a wholly.public system,
to draft legislation with a careful eye on the character of the recipient
institution in mind. For it seems that once the institution fits the profile
of Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer, the other judicial requirements are easily
met.
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